Southern Commerce Raiding Part 9

We finally come to the conclusion of reader Suvorov's series on Confederate commerce raiding in the Civil War, which has stretched from strategy and leadership through privateering, efforts to procure ironclads and the efforts of Raphael Semmes and the British-built Alabama, wrapping up after the end of the war.

Shenendoah, the last of the Confederate commerce raiders

In aggregate, the Confederacy destroyed nearly 250 merchant ships; about one thousand other American-flagged vessels were transferred to a foreign flag, in part to avoid risk of seizure and in part to reduce insurance premiums. Percentage-wise, around 5% of Northern shipping was destroyed. Other portions of the U.S. merchant fleet switched flags, hoping to avoid being targeted by raiders. Ultimately the size of the U.S. merchant fleet was roughly cut in half during the conflict (although, due to merchant ships flagging out, this does not imply a corresponding loss in commerce to the States.) The Union government spent around $3 million deploying about a hundred warships and other vessels to run the commerce-raiders down, mostly unsuccessfully.

According to James Bulloch, “[t]he object in getting as many cruisers at sea as possible…was…twofold.” The first and primary goal was “to destroy the enemy’s commerce, and thus to increase the burden of war upon a large and influential class at the North,” and the secondary goal was “to compel the United States Navy Department to send many of their best ships abroad for the pursuit of Confederate cruisers, and to increase their naval expenditure, which it was thought would tend to weaken the blockade.” But despite the fact that the Confederate Navy pursued this strategy with a great degree of success, they were unable to accomplish their goal.

Madawaska, one of the fast frigates built to chase commerce raiders

Ironically, the Union was much better able to survive the depredation of the Southern commerce-raiders than the South was able to withstand the havoc caused by the Northern blockade. And although the raiders were successful in a limited capacity at pulling Union warships away from blockade duty, the North had built nearly 700 ships by the end of the war, and could well afford to deploy scores of vessels to pursue lightly armed blockade runners, however fruitlessly. The vessels were extremely successful at scourging Union trade, as suggested not only by the vessels destroyed, but also the great diplomatic efforts the Union government went to in order to stop a mere handful of ships. The Navy even began working on a class of ships designed to hunt commerce raiders—slim, fast steamships built to pursue, but equally adept at commerce-raiding, should the need arise. However, these ships were not launched before the end of the war, and ended up wasting away dockside. Like so many other Union vessels, they were never to catch their elusive quarry, although the thought of getting a taste of the medicine they were happily providing to the Confederacy might have made England think twice about interfering in the war.

After the war, Semmes speculated that given the choice between the havoc wreaked upon Northern trade and successful Southern secession, the North would have chosen to let the South secede. “But he [Semmes’ enemy, the Northerner] seemed in the earlier stages of the war to have had no thought of losing his commerce; and when it became apparent that this misfortune would befall him, he was too deeply engaged in the contest to heed it.” Certainly Semmes can be criticized for somewhat overstating the damage he and his fellow raiders inflicted on the enemy, but results of the commerce raiding campaign indicate that the strategy pursued by Semmes and the rest of the Confederate Navy was sound, at least in terms of cost-effectiveness.

Kearsarge, victor over Alabama and so beloved that Federal law was changed to name a battleship after her when she was wrecked

It is arguably true that in a contest as existential for the South as the Civil War, any penny spent on unsuccessful methods of victory was one wasted. But ultimately, every Southern stratagem failed, and the commerce-raiding strategy failed not due to a fundamental defect in strategy. In hindsight, it is too easy to take Northern support for the war for granted, but at the time many Northerners were deeply ambivalent about the war, and targeting their morale was, fundamentally, a strategy worth pursuing. Nor did the Southern commerce-raiding venture fail for a lack of resources – indeed, it seems doubtful that doubling the resources the Confederacy committed to procuring cruisers would have altered the outcome of the conflict.

Rather, a combination of Northern resources and Northern will enabled the Union to absorb the losses inflicted, both to its finances and its morale. That is not to suggest that the South made a strategic mistake to pursue commerce raiding and the overseas procurement of warships, but rather to echo Semmes’ observation: war often brings with it a logic and ends of its own. Much like the paths of Southern commerce raiders, the courses set by men and nations once they commit to armed conflict are nearly impossible to predict.

A list of works I consulted, which might be interesting and/or useful:

Bulloch, James Dunwody. The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, Or, How the Confederate Cruisers Were Equipped, vol. 2. London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1883.
Bulloch’s memoirs provide access to his conduct during the war, and insight into Confederate strategic thought.

Carlise, Rodney. “Flagging Out in the American Civil War.” The Northern Mariner, XXII No. 1, (January 2012): 53 – 65.
This article, like Tucker’s, helpfully contextualized the losses sustained by the North’s merchant marine during the war. The articles argues that flagging out continued after the Civil War for economic reasons, contributing to the continuing decline of the American merchant marine.

“An Englishman’s Opinion of Our Public Men.” Brooklyn Daily Eagle, vol. 21 no. 125. May 27, 1862.
The archives of the Brooklyn Daily Eagle (which remains in business to this day) provide insight into the mind of New York City during the Civil War. This article in particular provided a humorous contemporary description of Welles.

“La Gloire.” Scientific American vol. 4. No 7., edited by Robert Porter. February 16, 1861.
This early volume of the Scientific American provides an interesting contemporary account of the Gloire, including an illustration. Stephen Mallory and other Americans likely relied on sources like this to maintain an awareness of European naval developments.

Musicant, Ivan. Divided Waters: The Naval History of the Civil War. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.
Musicant’s text gives the broad strokes of the naval history of the Civil War. This series relied mainly on Chapter 20, “On the High Seas.”

New York Herald. Edited by James Gordon Bennett.
— “Commander Preble and Secretary Welles,” November 7, 1862.
— “England’s Neutrality—The Trent, the Rebel Steamer Nashville, and Other Cases,” December 22, 1861, 4.
The Herald provides another glimpse into contemporary attitudes towards how Welles and his Navy handled the fight against Southern commerce raiders.

Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1862a.
A pamphlet—remarkably lacking in distinguishing features—containing American diplomatic correspondence. In order to prevent confusion between this source and another source, this reference when cited includes “1862a.” Note the next entry.

Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1862b.
Although seemingly identical to the previous Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs, I found this collection of American diplomatic notes contained different material. To distinguish between the two identically-named collections—which do not appear to credit an editor—this one is cited as “1862b.”

“The pirate Sumter firing at the brig Joseph Parks, of Boston.” Harper’s Weekly, vol. 6 no. 266. February 1, 1862.
The well-illustrated Harper’s Weekly serves as another window into Northern popular opinion during the war.

Semmes, Raphael. The Confederate Raider Alabama. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962.
This book, a selection from Semmes’ Memoirs of Service Afloat during the War between the States, was part of a series published by Indiana University Press for the Civil War centennial. Semmes’ writing is very detailed and includes his running commentary on politics and close observations of his naval exploits aboard the Alabama. The book also contains an alternate account of the Alabama’s final fight with the Kearsargeby her executive officer.

Soley, James Russell. The Navy in the Civil War, Volume 1: The Blockade and the Cruisers. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883.
A book published relatively soon after the close of the conflict, written by Professor James Russell Soley. This book provides an outline of the portions of the war concerning the Union blockade and events concerning Southern privateers and commerce destroyers, and also provides detailed information concerning the composition of the U.S. Navy at the beginning and end of the conflict.

Tucker, Spencer C. “CSS Alabama and Confederate Commerce Raiders during the U.S. Civil War.” In Commerce Raiding: Historical Case Studies, 1755 – 2009. Edited by Bruce A. Elleman and S. C. M. Paine, 73 – 88. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 2013.
Tucker’s article, with material drawn from his book Raphael Semmes and the Alabama, analyzes how much Southern commerce raiding impacted Northern commerce.

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.
— ser. 1 vol. 51 pt. 1. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1897.
— ser. 4 vol.1., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1900
— ser. 1 vol. 1. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The National Historical Society, 1987
— ser. 2 vol. 2. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The National Historical Society, 1987
The Official Records contain multitudes of letters to and from leading Civil War figures (Northern and Southern) on almost every conceivable topic, as well as other official documents.